CENTS

WORLD IN TURMOIL

Realities Facing U.S. Foreign Policy

40 th

ANNIVERSARY STATEMENT

FOREIGN POLICY ASSOCIATION, INCORPORATED

MISSIONARY RESEARCH
LIBRARY
NEW YORK CITY

Pam
Int. rel.

FEB 1 8 '59

WORLD IN TURMOIL

Realities Facing U.S. Foreign Policy

A Statement on the
Occasion of the 40th
Anniversary of the
Foreign Policy Association

BOARD OF DIRECTORS

EUSTACE SELIGMAN, *Chairman of the Board*

BROOKS EMENY, *President Emeritus*

JOHN W. NASON, *President*

MRS. ALBERT M. GREENFIELD, *Vice Chairman*

JOHN D. ROCKEFELLER, 3RD, *Vice Chairman*

GERALD F. BEAL, *Treasurer*

MRS. JOHN FRENCH, *Secretary*

H. HARVEY PIKE, *Chairman of Executive Committee*

Jervis J. Babb
William H. Baldwin
C. Waller Barrett
N. A. Bogdan
Robert R. Bowie
Mrs. A. Scott Bullitt
Benjamin J. Buttenwieser
Mrs. Andrew Galbraith Carey
John F. Chapman
Edwin F. Chinlund
James B. Conant
J. Richardson Dilworth
Charles W. Engelhard
John B. Inglis
B. Brewster Jennings
Mrs. W. Houston Kenyon, Jr. (Mildred Adams)
Harry W. Knight
Harold F. Linder
Albert A. List
William A. Lydgate
John Richardson, Jr.
Henry Siegbert
Emile E. Soubry
Jackson E. Spears
Miss Anna Lord Strauss
Walter H. Wheeler, Jr.
Henry S. Wingate

HONORARY

Mrs. Learned Hand
Paul Kellogg
Mrs. Henry Goddard Leach
Herbert L. May
Hon. James G. McDonald
Hon. H. Alexander Smith

FOREIGN POLICY ASSOCIATION, INCORPORATED
345 East 46th Street, New York 17, New York

FOREWORD

The Foreign Policy Association is taking the occasion of its 40th Anniversary to present a statement on United States foreign policy. This statement is not intended as a treatment of specific problems, but rather as an analysis of certain long-range and pervasive changes which are taking place in the world. These changes, revolutionary in character and significance, are among the realities with which our foreign policy must deal. At a time when the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and many private individuals and groups are taking stock of where our country now stands and in which directions we should set our future course, we hope this document may make some useful contribution to public discussion.

For 40 years the Foreign Policy Association has sought to provide information, to arouse concern and to encourage individual citizen responsibility for the crucial tasks of our generation. Each decade has set new conditions of effective operation. At the present time, the Association is engaged in the most extensive educational program in its history. It offers this analysis of foreign policy in the hope of helping American citizens to realize more fully the responsibilities they must exercise if this nation is to act in world affairs with the wisdom and realism required by the urgency of our times.

The Association is grateful to William J. Miller, chief editorial writer of the New York *Herald Tribune,* members of the FPA Board of Directors, staff and many friends, all of whom contributed to the preparation of this statement. It should be noted in this connection that the Association as a private, nonpartisan, educational agency takes no position on the many questions raised—except that it believes the raising of such issues and their intelligent consideration by the citizens of the United States are essential to the successful functioning of democracy in the modern world.

JOHN W. NASON
President

November 10, 1958

CONTENTS

Four Turbulent Decades 6

Communism the Central Problem 10

Non-Western Nationalism 14

New Technology 17

Population Explosion 19

Telescoping Economic and Social Changes 21

New Weapons 24

Emergence of World Community 26

A Look at the Future 28

What the Citizen Can Do 31

WORLD IN TURMOIL

Realities Facing U.S. Foreign Policy

On november 10, 1918, the eve of the armistice that ended the first world war of this century, a group of men and women gathered in New York, not to assess the wreckage left in the wake of battle nor to place the blame for this or that mistake in the nation's judgment, but to discuss what could be done about the future. These men and women did not waste time in bemoaning the past. Instead, they set out to provide the information and to stimulate the interest, both woefully lacking at that time, essential if this country was to play an intelligent and responsible role in world affairs.

The organization founded that night 40 years ago was the kernel of the Foreign Policy Association, which is dedicated to the nonpartisan education of American citizens in world affairs. It is in that spirit that on November 10, 1958, amid fresh dangers of war and new hopes of other armistices, the Association, like its founders, invites you to appraise the problems and prospects of the decades ahead. No one can be so arrogant as to blueprint the future. But all of us, as citizens of a democratic society, have a responsibility for understanding world affairs. This is essential for our nation's survival.

Four Turbulent Decades

If we are tempted to look with despair at the future, think of the world as it was in 1918, after four years of bloody trench warfare, and of the four turbulent decades through which we have since passed. We have witnessed the great depression of the 1930's, the rise of fascism and Nazism, the spread of communism, the conquests of Japan, Italy and Germany, the second world war, which this time shattered not only Europe but also Asia, the emergence of nationalism in the non-Western areas, the threats and tensions of the cold war, the new specter of nuclear destruction. Yet by that astounding miracle which is the capacity of man for survival, our earthly world is still intact, and other generations are wrestling with problems, old and new, with the undying hope that somehow, sometime, human beings will find a way of living with each other at peace.

U.S. in New Role

In the span of four decades—brief, as mankind's millenial history goes—the United States has achieved the role of a major power in a world where the influence of four great nations — Britain, France, Germany and Japan — had been sharply reduced, either through military defeat or through losses of economic assets and colonial possessions, or all of these combined. The United States, called upon to assume some of the obligations and burdens once borne by Britain around the globe, became the leader not only of the West, but also of other non-Communist nations. It found itself counterposed to the Communist bloc, dominated at first by the U.S.S.R., the only other great power which had emerged with enhanced influence from World War II, and later by the partnership of Russia and mainland China. The United States also learned that, like Britain in the past, it had to act as creditor—creditor both to war-

devastated Western nations and to underdeveloped lands. Most difficult of all, it was frequently placed in the position of mediating between its Western allies and their remaining colonial possessions.

In this new and many-faceted role that had to be learned quickly and under great pressure the United States has many reasons to be proud of its record. While sedulously avoiding resort to war, it has sought to prevent aggression around the globe. In 13 years since World War II it has spent $60 billion on foreign aid. It has encouraged underdeveloped peoples to improve their internal conditions through technical assistance while offering to assure their external security through military aid. It has sought to devise methods for reducing the dangers of the atom in war and developing its uses for peaceful purposes. It has increasingly turned to the United Nations for assistance in the settlement of international disputes that threaten peace, and has encouraged the UN secretary-general to take an active part in developing the peacemaking functions of the UN. And this impressive record has been achieved by both political parties cooperating on a bipartisan basis.

What To Do Next?

Yet in spite of this record there is a feeling of uneasiness in the United States because of doubts about the wisdom of policies followed in the past and of anxiety about the future. Alliances which seemed secure crumble without warning. Economies that had been shored up with American aid are threatened by new crises. War, which nuclear weapons have made too horrible to contemplate, is a recurring threat—one day in the Middle East, the next in the Formosa Strait. Nationalism and revolution are common occurrences around the globe, from Iraq to Cuba, from Venezuela to Indonesia. Money that could be spent on the development of the underdeveloped countries continues to be assigned to the construction of new and ever more frightful weapons.

The United States has not yet found a workable basis for the settlement of outstanding issues with Russia, has no formal relations with the most populous country in the world—mainland China, has not reconciled its own economic interests with those of raw-material exporting countries, sees no end to the arms race, and is often bewildered by revolts in the Middle East and Latin America. Hard pressed by these seemingly unending crises, conflicts and dilemmas, some Americans express doubts about the efficacy and value of the UN and other diplomatic machinery.

As Walter Lippmann said in an address before the National Citizens Commission for the Public Schools in San Francisco on March 19, 1954, "Think what has happened to the Western world and to its ideas and ideals during the 40 years since the world wars began. The hopes that men then took for granted are no longer taken for granted. The institutions and the way of life which we

have inherited, and which we cherish, have lost their paramount, their almost undisputed, hold upon the allegiance and the affections and the hopes of the peoples of the earth. They are no longer universally accepted as being the right way towards the good life on this earth. They are fiercely challenged abroad. They are widely doubted and they are dangerously violated even here at home. . . .

"We are living in an age of disorder and upheaval. Though the United States has grown powerful and rich, we know in our hearts that we have become, at the same time, insecure and anxious. Our people enjoy an abundance of material things, such as no large community of men has ever known. But our people are not happy about their position or confident about their future. For we are not sure whether our responsibilities are not greater than our power and our wisdom.

"We have been raised to the first place in the leadership of the Western society at a time when the general civilization of the West has suffered a spectacular decline and is gravely threatened. We, who have become so suddenly the protecting and the leading power of that civilization, are not clear and united among ourselves about where we are going and how we should deal with our unforeseen responsibilities, our unwanted mission, our unexpected duties."

Are the pessimists right in assuming that we face a situation from which there is no exit? Is there reason to throw up our hands in despair, to say that we have done our best but can do no more, and to attempt to cut some of the world's Gordian knots either by war or by abandoning the UN and retreating into isolation?

Perfect Policy Impossible

No responsible person will claim that we have an easy road ahead, or that, even with the cooperation of the other peoples of the world, we can hope to solve all the problems that exist today or may arise tomorrow. But no mature person expects that life will ever be free of conflicts, disappointments, setbacks and defeats. And no mature nation will give up the struggle to do the best it can in coping with the difficulties that have beset mankind since the dawn of history. Nor can any nation, at some time or other, avoid committing errors, acting on false assumptions, or offending friends, not to speak of enemies.

What we need to do today is not to bewail the past, nor to look for convenient scapegoats at home or abroad. We cannot demand that the United States devise, once and for all, a coherent, comprehensible, rational, imaginative, bold and farsighted policy that will simultaneously please the majority of American voters, our allies around the world as well as the noncommitted countries, and will at the same time assure successful negotiations with our opponents to bring about a just and lasting peace.

To demand this is like demanding that someone square the

circle. Franklin D. Roosevelt was no more successful in winning the cooperation of Russia than Dwight D. Eisenhower. Dean Acheson was no more ready to recognize Peiping than John Foster Dulles. Democrats who criticize the Eisenhower Administration for having accepted half a loaf in Korea and Indochina rather than pressing for continuance of war must be asked whether they would have supported war indefinitely in preference to a lame peace. Republicans who argue that the United States "lost" China after World War II must be asked whether they were then ready to finance a struggle against the Communists, which, it has been estimated by military experts, would have required us to send a million soldiers to the China mainland.

Communism the Central Problem

The central problem which has dominated United States foreign policy since World War II is that of dealing with communism —both with the Communist ideology and with the declared ambitions of the two great Communist powers, the U.S.S.R. and Communist China.

Again and again the Communist hierarchy, from Lenin to Khrushchev, have reiterated their conviction that they are engaged in a death struggle with the free world and that they will win. Their tactics fluctuate and their policies seem to blow hot and cold as the exigencies of power politics demand, but the professed goal of international communism remains a constant, dominating and inescapable threat to the United States and the free world as a whole. Moreover, the aggressive and expansionist activities of the Sino-Soviet bloc lend support to Communist assertions. Russian expansion into Eastern Europe and Communist expansion in China, Korea, Tibet and Southeast Asia have added 750 million people to the Communist world. A majority of the people in the United States are convinced that the Communist powers are determined to conquer and subjugate the non-Communist countries, either by direct aggression, or by indirect subversion, or by influence wielded through propaganda, trade and economic aid, or by all these methods combined.

Given this situation of opposition and hostility, United States policy has been forced to develop and hold a position of strength. We have believed that, if the United States does not maintain a military force sufficient to deter aggression, the Communist powers will try to achieve their objectives by force or threat of force, and that as leader of the non-Communist world this country must remain armed until such time as the U.S.S.R. and Communist China have given unmistakable evidence of a change of heart.

With this aim in mind, the United States continues to build up its armaments, including A- and H-bombs and guided missiles;

has constructed bases on the territory of friendly nations along the periphery of the U.S.S.R. and Communist China; gives military aid to nations which are willing to resist the Communist bloc, from Turkey to Japan; has become the defender of the Nationalist Chinese government on Formosa; is a leading member of several military alliances—NATO, SEATO, the Baghdad pact (now bereft of Baghdad) and ANZUS; and has countered Communist propaganda through propaganda of its own, directed particularly at the countries of Eastern Europe.

American leaders, both Republicans and Democrats, believe that this vast complex of military, economic and propaganda undertakings is designed to protect not this country alone, but the entire free world. This view has received vigorous endorsement from leaders of countries allied with the United States, among them Paul-Henri Spaak of Belgium, secretary-general of NATO, who at a meeting of the Atlantic Treaty Association in Boston on September 27, 1958 said: "We must assess the magnitude of the challenge thrown out to us. It must be clearly understood that the challenge is not that of the U.S.S.R. to the United States. It is the challenge of the whole Communist world to the whole free world and the countries of the free world must accept the challenge collectively, in all fields and everywhere. That is their only chance of winning."

At the same time the vast majority of Americans are firmly opposed to initiating a preventive war against the Communist bloc. Whatever opposition there may be in terms of ideology, some form of peaceful coexistence is sought. Indeed, the United States offered to include the U.S.S.R. and the countries of Eastern Europe among the recipients of Marshall Plan aid and was even willing to oppose its allies, Britain and France, when they resorted to aggression at Suez. Nor has the United States, in spite of statements in 1952 about the liberation of the Eastern European countries, intervened militarily in that area even when unrest among Russia's satellites, breaking out into actual revolt in Hungary, seemed to offer an opportunity to strike a blow against the Soviet Union.

The question today is whether the United States should gird itself for a fight to the finish with the Soviet bloc, or whether it can maintain a position of adequate military strength and at the same time take steps to reduce the risk of war. Many believe that it is impossible to expect any change on the part of the Communists, that we must be prepared to do battle with communism everywhere in the world, with every sort of weapon, including, if necessary, nuclear warheads in intercontinental guided missiles; that consequently the United States must continue to strengthen its present military position as the only real deterrent to Moscow and Peiping; and that we should avoid wide-ranging negotiations which might require us to alter our course. Others, however, hold a different view. They suggest that no form of society is impervious to change and that

communism is no more likely to prove eternal than other systems; that the United States must take care to distinguish between the nationalist aspirations and needs of the Communist nations — which would persist even if communism disappeared tomorrow—and the drives which stem from a Communist ideology; and that the West must guard against developing an anti-Communist attitude so rigid as to exclude the possibility of any successful negotiation.

They therefore believe that military defense is not enough at this stage, and urge that the United States, while maintaining its armaments, should explore every possibility of reducing tensions and breaking down barriers between the Communist and non-Communist worlds. Among the measures currently advocated, or already initiated, are inspection and control of nuclear tests, steps toward arms limitation, efforts to avert surprise attacks, expanded trade, increased educational and cultural exchanges, and above all constant efforts to persuade the U.S.S.R. and Communist China that this country and its allies do not intend to commit aggression against them in order to destroy their existing political, economic and social systems.

Such a program, it is argued, would over a period of time lead the U.S.S.R. and Communist China to recognize that it is in their own best interest to accept with sincerity the principle of peaceful coexistence.

But Communism Not Only Problem

While communism is the central problem facing United States foreign policy, it is by no means the only one. Many other issues of great importance exist today. To ignore them or to underemphasize their seriousness and to focus our attention solely on the cold war would be a great error.

New questions are pressing on us from all sides in a century of revolutionary changes which profoundly affect every aspect of human existence. Even those ideas which have remained constant through the millenia of man's existence may have to be reconsidered in an age when six man-made satellites have been sent hurtling through the heavens within a single year at speeds of 18,000 miles an hour; when journeys to the moon are no longer regarded as in the realm of science fiction; when atomic submarines, charged with virtually inexhaustible energy and capable of staying submerged indefinitely, can travel beneath the ice of the Arctic Ocean; when Keokuk, Iowa, is only 25 minutes away from a guided missile carrying a hydrogen bomb fired from Siberia.

The world is becoming ever more wondrous—as well as more fearsome. Man is changing not only his environment through fission and fusion; he is also changing relations between human beings in the underdeveloped countries, where explosive economic and social forces are at work, and, less violently, in the advanced nations of

the West. And man is changing relations between nations which find themselves, often against their will, accepting hitherto undreamed of restrictions on their sovereign rights for the sake of achieving cooperation through the UN and other international agencies.

Communism, like Nazism and fascism before it, is both a product of these revolutionary changes and an explosive force which keeps these changes at a boiling point. It hampers the efforts of non-Communist countries to stabilize a world in ferment. But the disappearance of communism would not of itself bring an end to this ferment, which started before Karl Marx wrote *Das Kapital* and Lenin seized power in Russia. What are these revolutionary changes? And what are some of the questions they raise for our foreign policy? There are six main revolutions simultaneously taking place in the world today.

Non-Western Nationalism

First, there is the revolutionary change wrought by *nationalism*. True, nationalism is not a new force. It has been at work in Europe for several centuries; it forged the nation-states of the French and English; it came to fruition late in the 19th century in Germany and Italy; and it broke up the Austro-Hungarian Empire at the end of World War I, when Czechs, Poles, Hungarians and others invoked the principle of "self-determination of nations" proclaimed by Woodrow Wilson as one of his Fourteen Points. Nor have the Western peoples reached the stage of development when they would be willing to repudiate their attachment to nationalism.

What is new is that today nationalism is at work throughout the non-Western world, many of whose peoples—in the Middle East, in Africa, in Asia—had either been ruled for several centuries by Western powers or had been subjects of the Ottoman Empire, dissolved in 1919 as a result of World War I. Since 1945 the demand for independence, like charges of dynamite, has exploded from India to Ghana, from Guinea to Tunisia and Morocco, from Algeria to Indonesia. In some areas independence has been achieved by peaceful means—although not without accompanying riots and painful readjustments, as in India and Pakistan. In others, the assertion of freedom from one form or another of outside domination has brought war or threat of war, as in Egypt, following the nationalization of the Suez Canal, or in Algeria, regarded by France as an integral part of its territory. In some areas of the world nationalism has become bound up with communism, as in China; in others, it has been inspired by European democratic ideas—the ideas of John Stuart Mill's *Essay on Liberty,* of Mazzini and Kossuth—as was the case in India.

Causes of Anti-Westernism

But whatever may have been the original source of inspiration, nationalism in non-Western lands often takes the form of anti-Westernism and of hostility toward the white man, for in the past many of the nonwhite peoples of the world were ruled by Western powers and suffered from racial discrimination. Because of this heritage of resentment, which it may take many decades to liquidate, non-Westerners are much more quick to be suspicious of the remnants of what they call Western imperialism than of the repressive rule of Communist Russia in Eastern Europe. This is in part because they have not been subjected to Russia, and in part because they regard Russia's relations with its satellites as conflicts between white, not between white and colored, peoples.

In spite of the fact that the United States has been traditionally an anticolonial country, and that in the past we have strongly supported the demands of colonial peoples for independence, this country is often the target of anti-Westernism. This is due not so much to our own actions—since our record in the Philippines, for example, has won widespread approval—but to our close association in NATO since 1949 with Western nations which still hold colonial possessions—Britain and France, Belgium and Portugal. True, Britain since 1945 and France under its new 1958 constitution have made clear their willingness to relinquish colonial possessions which desire independence. It takes time, however, for leaders of former or existing colonies to forget their still recent resentment of Western colonialism.

When we deal with the new, or emerging, nations of the Middle East, Asia and Africa, we are often disturbed by their anti-Westernism, their insistence on choosing their own course in world affairs, their preference for neutralism, their desire to determine their economic future free from any form of foreign intervention which they have not themselves invited. Their attitude and actions cause us to be worried about the prospect or actuality of revolutions, as in the case of Iraq; to express alarm when non-Western countries nationalize their resources, such as oil in Iran, or other assets within their territories, such as the Suez Canal in Egypt; to intervene when we think that our economic or security interests may be at stake, as in the case of Lebanon. We are inclined to concentrate on what we conceive to be the role of these countries in the conflict between the West and the U.S.S.R. rather than to view their future development in terms of their interests as they see them.

Can anything we do—by force or by persuasion—stop the rise of nationalism any more than Metternich's attempt to hold down revolutions in 19th-century Europe prevented Mazzini and Kossuth from ultimately winning independence for Italy and Hungary? (At that time the shrewd statesman Talleyrand said, "One can do everything with bayonets except sit on them"). If we cannot check na-

tionalism as some Americans would like to do, ought we to help it by making clear our sympathy for popular nationalist movements and offering our aid in their support? What should be our policy if it is doubtful whether the peoples in question are yet ready for the responsibilities of independent nationhood?

Should we insist that the acceptance of our assistance excludes help from other sources, notably the U.S.S.R.? Not every underdeveloped country wants to deal exclusively with the West or with one Western country only. Let us remember that Japan, when it was modernizing its economy in the late 19th century, did not simply copy the United States or Britain, but carefully selected those features of economic, social and political development abroad which it thought best adapted to its needs.

We must also recognize that revolution seldom comes unless people have no possibility of changing by peaceful means conditions they regard as intolerable, and is almost never accomplished without struggle, violent incidents and the loss of traditions, institutions or patterns of life. It would be well for our own diplomats, technical experts and others who go to non-Western countries to review the history of Western nations. Democracy was not won without revolutions—and such grim episodes as the decapitation of Charles I of England, the guillotining of Louis XVI and Marie Antoinette of France, the Boston Tea Party and its aftermath. The Industrial Revolution brought bitter economic and social convulsions in England as well as in India and the Middle East.

New Technology

Second, there is the revolutionary change brought about by *technology*. Again, this is not entirely new, for nearly 200 years ago James Watt's tea kettle also set off revolutionary changes. But what is new today is the possibility, opened up by the multiplicity of scientific inventions and by rapid communications, of placing technology at the disposal of the non-Western peoples who, at the time of the Industrial Revolution, were still in a "deep sleep" as compared with the dramatic awakening of the Western world. Today the peasants of Bolivia and Nepal know that means exist to liberate them from the prison of their ancient environment, that machines can bring them shoes for their bare feet, tractors to plow their ancient soil and fertilizer to enrich it, and perhaps even atomic explosions to unlock new resources, or create new ports or move mountains, and antibiotics to cure diseases which had once seemed imposed by fate.

Science has aroused "the revolution of rising expectations"—and peoples everywhere want to benefit by the promises of science, whether originating in Communist or non-Communist countries. And because the United States is more advanced, more wealthy, more skilled than the non-Western countries can hope to be in the visible future, the latter often find it more helpful to study the technological achievements of the U.S.S.R., which only 50 or so years ago was close to their stage of development, and whose experience they believe, rightly or wrongly, may be of greater immediate use to them than that of Americans. They are impressed by dynamos, diesel engines, television sets, electricity, atomic reactors, earth satellites, wherever they come from—but what impresses them most of all is to know that a recently underdeveloped country can produce these new marvels of technology.

Here are some of the questions posed by the revolution of technology. How rapid an advance among the non-Western peoples

is possible or desirable? Are there dangers in pressing economic development to the point where a country's economy will stumble or collapse? Is it desirable to have as many nations as possible, including those of the Soviet bloc, share in the cost of development, or are there dangers in Communist economic aid which we should urge other countries to avoid?

Should we advise the non-Western countries to concentrate on agricultural modernization at this stage of development and oppose industrialization, which many of them eagerly seek for psychological and prestige reasons as well as for reasons of economics? Or should we make available to the non-Western peoples far larger amounts of money than we have dreamed of until now for more rapid industrialization, even if this money must be furnished by the American government or international agencies rather than by private enterprise? Some Americans fear the threat of potential competition from newly created industries abroad, but do we realize that we can sell more of our manufactured goods to industrial, than to backward, nations?

Should we use our technological resources to help increase the food production of Western agricultural countries, including our own—instead of curtailing it, as we do now—and provide, out of a world food bank, as suggested by Prime Minister John Diefenbaker of Canada, food to the non-Western peoples over several decades, thus giving them an opportunity to start industrialization without meanwhile worrying constantly about the need to feed growing populations?

Population Explosion

Third, we have the revolutionary change created by the *population explosion.* Anxiety that population growth may exceed available resources of food and other amenities is not new. The Reverend Thomas Robert Malthus, at the end of the 18th century, gloomily prophesied that the population of Western Europe would soon exceed food resources unless either positive checks (war, pestilence and other disasters) or preventive checks (birth restriction) went into effect. By a fortunate combination of circumstances, however, Western Europe was able to prove Malthus wrong. The discovery of the New World opened up outlets for emigration; the modernization of agriculture assured an increasing food supply with a reduced number of workers on the land; and urbanization encouraged voluntary reduction in the number of children per family.

The population explosion which Europe might have experienced now confronts many of the non-Western countries where death control (through the reduction of war and civil strife, public health improvement, use of antibiotics and other drugs to alleviate the ravages of various diseases, and of DDT to check malaria) has usually not been accompanied by birth control. Some countries which do not object to planned parenthood on religious grounds have initiated official programs to stabilize their populations—notably India with nearly 400 million, Japan with 91 million crowded into a cluster of islands, and Egypt with 24 million squeezed into a narrow fertile strip of land along the Nile. But except in the case of Japan, poverty and illiteracy have so far prevented prompt results, and countries which have vast populations today can, at best, hope to reach a stabilization point 50 to 100 years from now, but not to achieve a significant decrease. Nor can they expect to find in emigration overseas the outlet that relieved population pressure in Europe at a comparable stage of development, not only because few habitable territories remain open for large-scale movement to other areas of the world, but also because some regions which have

space available—for example Australia—practice a "whites only" immigration policy.

Under the circumstances, the population explosion may prove to be the most dangerous problem that will face mankind, not 40 years from now, but within the next decade or two. It is like a time bomb ticking away in non-Western areas—India, China, the Middle East, Algeria—as well as in some of the countries of Latin America—and may blow us all sky-high, while we worry about the explosive potential of the A- or H-bomb.

Was Malthus Right?

How are we to accommodate our thinking and our policies to this pervasive and inescapable problem? If a cheap process for desalting ocean waters were developed, could deserts such as the Sahara be rendered capable of absorbing excess population when provided with cheap atomic power? Should the United States urge the formation, as a top priority, of an international UN commission to investigate possibilities for the emigration of nonwhites to habitable areas? Can any of the Western nations absorb at least small numbers of nonwhites to relieve the population problems of non-Western areas?

Should the United States give an example to other nations by altering its own immigration laws and admitting additional numbers of nonwhites? If not, should this country contribute funds for resettlement of these people in other areas of the world? Should the United States give financial and scientific support to the intensive search now being made to discover inexpensive contraceptives? To what extent does our experience with Puerto Rico—and with immigrants from that island—serve as an example of what might be accomplished elsewhere? What can be done to discover as soon as possible the secret of making palatable synthetic foods through photosynthesis or other methods?

Meanwhile, however, the ratio of food to population is not the only issue raised by the population explosion. Many other shortages are in sight. There is a shortage of water, not only in areas which suffered from inadequacy of water in the past such as the Middle East, but even in the United States. Housing, education, employment opportunities—all these are already frighteningly inadequate in India and Ceylon, in China and some of the Latin American countries. When we think that, according to UN estimates, the world's population will double before the end of this century and that in 1958 alone China will add 12 million newborn to its population—or the equivalent to the population of 12 Baltimores—can we and the rest of the world afford not to take the time in trying to find some remedies for what could turn out to be a greater catastrophe than nuclear war? Will Malthus, proved wrong in Europe, prove right in the underdeveloped countries?

Telescoping Economic and Social Changes

The revolutions in technology and the population explosion both cause and aggravate the *economic and social revolution.*

In the non-Western world both the peoples who are already independent and those who hope to achieve self-government in the not-too-distant future face a stupendous task never faced by the West at a comparable stage of history. They must, at one and the same time, reorganize their political institutions, modernize their often feudal economies and raise their agricultural production while undertaking at least a modicum of industrialization. They must assure their vast and still-growing populations sufficient education and training in technical skills so that men and women can effectively participate in a rapidly changing society. They must in the midst of the cold war between the West and the U.S.S.R. develop foreign policies from scratch.

All this, and much more, they must do, if possible by peaceful means, with the voluntary cooperation of their citizens rather than by dictatorship and resort to force. In short, the non-Western countries must telescope into a few years or, at most, decades the complex and strenuous changes which the West, through a combination of fortunate circumstances, was able to assimilate gradually over some 400 or 500 years—and even then not without grave political, economic and social crises. This has been as true of Russia in the past four decades as it is of China today. It is true of the Middle East, Asia, Africa, and also of Latin America, which is part of the Western Hemisphere, but whose problems are comparable to those of the non-Western world.

Mobility Without Stability

As a result of these seismic changes, long-settled societies are becoming mobile, just as was the case in Western Europe after the breakup of the static economy of the manor and the rise of towns, which in turn brought about the emergence of the middle class, the political revolutions of England and France, the acceleration of the Industrial Revolution, the spread of democracy and, eventually, the creation of the economic and social democratic institutions with which we are familiar today in Western nations. The great problem of the underdeveloped countries today is how to achieve economic and social stability in the midst of churning mobility—and thus bring about conditions that could assure political stability as well.

The internal strains imposed on non-Western countries by the twofold task of modernizing backward economies while at the same time trying to meet 20th-century welfare demands have no precedent in history. It should come as no surprise to the West if these strains, for some time to come, lead to the continuance of dictatorships now in power or the adoption of authoritarian institutions where they do not as yet exist.

Nor can the Western nations ask the non-Western peoples to develop at a more leisurely pace, to concentrate on agriculture now and leave industrialization until another day. These are people who have just awakened to the potential benefits of 20th-century technology and economy; they know they have lost several hundred years while the West forged ahead; they are in a hurry and have no intention of waiting for "pie in the sky by-and-by." As India's Prime Minister Nehru has said, they "are no longer quiet." They want public health, education, housing, jobs, better food and clothing now, not in some dim future. And because of the population explosion the majority of them are young people who are impatient with the ways of the old, who want reforms as quickly as possible, no matter what the cost, and who resent both their own more cautious political leaders and the Western nations, which, they contend, are trying to hold back their development.

In fact, it is difficult to see how it would be possible to select one factor in the development process, such as agriculture, and concentrate on it to the exclusion of others. If the experience of the West is a guide, modernization of agriculture is interrelated with literacy, literacy is interrelated with capacity to improve agriculture as well as to build dams and factories. And only the emergence of an increasingly literate, technically trained population which has learned to accept changes in its economic and social way of life can bring about, eventually, that free and independent-minded participation in political life which we call democracy. As the sociologist Daniel Lerner has well pointed out in his book, *The Passing of Traditional Society: Modernizing the Middle East,* democracy in

the West was the end result, not the starting point, of economic and social development.

Problems of Western Societies

Economic and social changes, however, although most dramatic in the non-Western countries, are also at work in the countries of the West. There the growth of urbanization, the expansion and concentration of industrial enterprises, the increasing complexity of technology and of economic and social relations between human beings who have come to regard education, health, social security, protection against unemployment and other aspects of welfare not as a privilege, but as the right of every citizen, are creating new problems. The growing discussion in the United States about "the trend toward conformity," "the organization man," and "the exploding metropolis" serviced by "insolent chariots" and frightened by juvenile delinquency, points up some of these problems. And meanwhile all the advanced industrial nations are wondering where they will be able to sell the products of their ever more affluent and abundant industry and agriculture unless substantial changes are made in the methods of trade between nations.

Here are some questions Americans must ask themselves. Even though it can be cogently argued that many underdeveloped countries could make greater progress in improving their standard of living through the introduction of modern agricultural techniques, should we nevertheless do everything we can to meet their desires by fostering industrialization? Or would industrialization prove a mirage for countries burdened at the start by vast populations? Should we help to initiate a world campaign to end illiteracy, such as is now being conducted in Communist China, in the hope that literate people will move more rapidly toward freer institutions?

Can the non-Western peoples carry out the stupendous transformations required to alter their ancient ways of life by democratic means, as India is trying to do? Or will they have to use ruthless methods, like Russia and China? In 50 or 100 years' time will the Russian, or Chinese, pattern of communism have won out over Western-type democracy, as predicted by Nikita Khrushchev, because of the inability of the newly created democratic governments to persuade their people to make the temporary sacrifices necessary to achieve a higher economic level—sacrifices which Communist regimes do not hesitate to impose by forced reduction of consumption and by slave labor? Or can we, in the West, by furnishing capital to these new countries, assist them in rapidly raising their standard of living and thus reduce the risk that they may turn to communism as the only solution to their problems?

New Weapons

Meanwhile, however, we also have to face the possibly catastrophic consequences of a fifth revolution, the revolution in *weaponry*. True, people have been killed or injured from the beginning of time, long before nuclear fission, by a wide variety of weapons, from the implements of the stone, bronze and iron ages and the bow and arrow to ordinary nonjet planes dropping ordinary bombs during World War II over enemy cities and killing thousands of people in a single raid. And it can be argued that to those who die it does not really matter what hit them—whether conventional weapons or such new, unconventional weapons as A- and H-bombs and guided missiles.

Today, however, there are three new elements in the picture. First, we know that the use of nuclear weapons could result in destruction of such dimensions, unknown in any past war, as to wipe out, if not the whole globe, at least large sectors of it, and to destroy resources which would be irreplaceable by those who would survive. This prospect poses not only a practical issue, but also a moral problem of such magnitude that it has inspired a world-wide debate about the desirability of eliminating all nuclear weapons. Second, there is sufficient doubt among experts about genetic and other damage to future generations from radiation, whether continued on the present scale or increased by more frequent or extensive nuclear tests, to create a strong sentiment in favor of stopping all nuclear tests and of eliminating all nuclear weapons.

Deterrent of Terror

On the other side of the scale there is a third new element—and this is the belief that equality in the possession of nuclear weapons and the capacity to produce them, such as has recently been achieved between the United States and the U.S.S.R., acts as a de-

terrent of terror and stops war. It is argued that even the Communists, aware that nuclear weapons will not discriminate between ideologies and will destroy Communist as well as democratic countries, may be as chary as the United States in resorting to this ultimate weapon.

Yet this concept of mutual deterrence through nuclear terror paradoxically involves continuance of the arms race in order to maintain the supposedly safeguarding equality. The result could be a vicious circle of tests and countertests, new forms of horrible weapons piled upon each other. This is the grim prospect we face unless the two sides in the cold war can agree on mutual inspection permitting the suspension or cessation of tests (except, perhaps, for peaceful uses of atomic energy) and eventually on the dismantling of existing stockpiles of nuclear weapons, or their transfer by the nuclear powers to the control of the UN.

The questions raised by the revolution in weaponry are complex and far-reaching. Is it safe, or even sensible, to rely on the deterrence of modern weapons? Would the United States, for example, refrain from using A- or H-bombs against the Chinese Communists if the alternative were a long, bloody and inconclusive struggle in the Formosa Strait and on the China mainland? Could the Russians be counted on not to use what they consider decisive weapons if engaged in a war in some area where the U.S.S.R. felt it had a strategic interest? What about the danger of unleashing destruction of a part of the world though incautious action by one or a few trigger-happy or merely ill-informed aviators on either side? By emphasizing nuclear weapons, do we deprive ourselves of the possibility of waging limited, nonnuclear war? In view of the incredibly destructive power of modern weaponry, how can we improve the machinery for arriving at reasonable and just solutions by peaceful means? Have we considered adequately the potential danger to the world if other countries in addition to the United States, the U.S.S.R. and Britain gain possession of nuclear weapons?

Can any of us do anything constructive about the other revolutions of our times if our minds and nerves are dominated by fear of ultimate world disaster? Have we made an adequate effort to reconsider the political, economic and ideological issues that keep us in a state of conflict, as measured against the dangers that confront the entire world community? Are there any fresh approaches we have all left unexplored in any area where the potential combatants can be kept effectively apart by noncommitted nations until we can all find some way of resolving current conflicts?

Emergence of World Community

Whether or not the United States, and the rest of the world, can discover answers to the many questions raised by the five other revolutions will depend on the outcome of the sixth revolution—the revolutionary change in the *world community.*

Before 1945 we all thought in terms of a multipower world, with political, economic and military strength sufficiently dispersed among a number of great nations so that no one or two of them could hope to determine the fate of the globe, but each would have to find and keep allies for a given eventuality. World War II shattered this multipower system, in which a rough kind of balance had been maintained, largely through the policy of Britain, which over the centuries showed great skill in holding the scales more or less even on the European continent while it built a vast empire overseas.

But after 1945, as already noted, the United States found itself under the necessity of taking over some of Britain's commitments—political, military and economic—just at a time when the second greatest power remaining after the war, the U.S.S.R., began to play a major role in world affairs. The bipolarization of the world resulted in a new set of alliances, with Russia grouped on one side with its Eastern European satellites and, after 1950, Communist China, and the United States on the other with NATO, SEATO and the Baghdad pact countries.

But while the great powers continued to vie for position on the lines of the old balance of power, and small nations, old and new, sought added strength through the formation of blocs within the UN, a revolutionary change was taking place in the role of the world community. The UN, which possesses no armed forces or diplomatic corps of its own, was increasingly called upon to separate potential combatants, to alleviate seemingly hopeless controversies —over Suez, over Hungary, over Lebanon and Jordan. While the secretary-general, Dag Hammarskjold, has no material power at

his command, the mutual fears of both sides place him in a position where he can discreetly play the role of arbiter and mediator. In the UN, as Charles Malik, president of the 1958 General Assembly, put it, an effort can be made to look at international problems from the point of view not of just one nation or region, but of the world as a whole.

The world community, however, is still in a transitional stage from the nation-state claiming unrestricted sovereignty for itself (although quite ready to curtail that of other sovereign states whom it regards as opponents) to a world-wide system of law and order. When commentators say that "the Formosa crisis puts the UN to the test" or "the UN fails to solve the Lebanon problem," what we really mean is that the member states of the UN have been tested and found wanting. Yet, to a greater extent than the League of Nations, the UN has provided an opportunity for determining the world's "sense of the meeting," for focusing public opinion on controversial issues, and for blunting the edges of conflicts which might otherwise have erupted into open warfare.

The United States has given increasing support to the UN, both material and moral. But, like other nations, it has continued to operate on two planes—the plane of old-fashioned alliances, permitted under Article 51 of the UN Charter, until such time as the UN acquires a force of its own for the maintenance of collective security, and the plane of the new world community. And the UN has been frequently weakened, sometimes paralyzed, by the persistence of East-West tension, which has been constantly present at its discussions.

Here are some of the questions that Americans may ask themselves about the change in the balance of power. Should the United States do everything it can to strengthen the UN and to enlarge the scope of its influence? Or should it go to the UN, like other nations, only *in extremis*—after other means have been tried and found inadequate, such as unilateral intervention in Lebanon or the Warsaw talks with Peiping? Or should it rely on military alliances, treating the UN merely as a forum for discussions?

Should we be more energetic in pressing for the creation of a UN force, or is this inadvisable at the present time? Should we channel more of our financial aid through the technical assistance program of the UN? What problems will the United States face if it should find itself frequently in the minority at the UN? What changes in our policy might be necessary to avoid such a situation? In short, should the United States, which regards itself as the strongest military, financial and economic power in the world, set the example to other nations of what a morally great power might be when the world community begins to function more fully tomorrow?

A Look at the Future

Any one of the profound and pervasive changes outlined above would put a serious strain on our society and create many serious problems for the world community. What we need to keep in mind, however, is that in the non-Western world all these changes are converging at the same time and are telescoped into a brief period instead of being spread over centuries, as was the case in the development of the West. Moreover, the disturbing effects of these changes are being used by the Communist bloc for its own purposes, and thus the struggle between East and West, which is the backdrop of the world stage today, makes calm analysis and rational treatment of these changes all the more difficult. But if it is true that the Communists are taking advantage of revolutionary changes, why cannot the democracies do this too?

The cold war between the Communist powers and the non-Communist world, and the revolutionary changes which this war exacerbates, are transforming the international scene at such a breathtaking pace that we are apt to feel confused and to shy away from accepting the consequences they entail. Just to say, "Yes, we live in an age of revolutions," is not enough. When Carlyle heard about Margaret Fuller's exclamation, "I accept the universe," he said dryly: "By God! she'd better."

It is not easy to read the future even though many of its features are implicit in what is today happening in the world. We cannot hope to be right all the time, or to be always the victor, but we must do our best to base our policies on the realities of our changing world rather than on pleasant illusions or wishful thinking. If the premises on which we have been acting do not square with the facts, however unpleasant or repugnant, it behooves us to review the bases of our thinking and to devise new policies which hold a greater promise of success.

Like other great powers, the United States tends to view

major world issues in the oversimplified terms of its own national interests (which may not always coincide with the interests of the world as a whole), and to assume that there is only one proper way—the American way—to settle a given predicament. This is natural, but it is not always wise. It might be helpful for Americans, as for other peoples, to heed the practical counsel of the humble Jacobowsky in Franz Werfel's play, *Jacobowsky and the Colonel,* that no matter how great the crisis, "there are always two possibilities"—and often many more than two. It is just conceivable that at any given time some other possibility than the one offered by the United States might provide a way out of this or that dilemma.

No Final Solution

The tensions amid which this country has been developing its foreign policy might be eased if Americans could accept the idea that there is no final "solution" to any problem between nations any more than between individuals. Nor can we hope to achieve at any time a peace that would be "just" in the abstract (it might seem just to us, but what about our opponents or our friendly critics?) or "lasting" (we need only an elementary knowledge of history to know that nothing on earth is eternal). In world affairs, as in relations between business and labor, between North and South, between members of a family, there is a continuous process of trying to "accommodate," "adjust," "reconcile," conflicting interests which each side regards as legitimate, and thus to reach an acceptable "compromise" or find "a common ground." None of these words should be regarded as unacceptable in the vocabulary of our foreign policy makers.

For, given the will and the effort, some problems can be eased (mankind would not have survived for millenia were this not the case) and removed from the area of harsh, war-provoking controversies. If measures of a multinational character, visibly useful to all mankind, irrespective of ideologies, can be adopted to check population growth, to provide new food resources, to raise living standards in underdeveloped countries, to assure political and social stability in societies now in transition from the Middle Ages to the Age of the Atom and the United Nations, some of the existing tensions and rivalries could be relaxed, and some of the sharp lines now dividing bloc from bloc within and outside the UN could be gradually softened.

Whenever we feel impatient, let us remember that if we can accept "all deliberate speed" in the adjustment of relations between the white and Negro citizens of the United States, we should be willing to accept it also in our relations with other nations, which may be as hesitant about change as some of the people of our South. And if we often feel frustrated, let us heed the advice of Ralph McGill, editor of *The Atlanta Constitution,* who, speaking of the

moderates of the South, says that they learn patience and "acceptance of the fact that frustration is not defeat, though it can be almost as bitter."

In short, what we need most urgently today is not a complete set of new ideas about foreign policy—in any country and in any generation there are but few truly creative minds—but a psychological reorientation to the problems of our times. Then we can begin to fit the many fragments of an increasingly complex universe into some new, more workable, more effective pattern that might be more acceptable not only to ourselves but to other peoples among whom, whether we like it or not, we must continue to live.

What the Citizen Can Do

Every civilization has turning points when it must summon the resolution to meet new situations for which the past furnishes little precedent. The pace and scope of the revolutionary changes around us make it plain that the United States, if it is to fulfill its self-imposed assignment of leader of the non-Communist world, faces today a challenge of this magnitude.

Two questions now confront us as citizens. First, how can the United States plan and act with the boldness, imagination and adaptability to new factors which such leadership demands? And, second and fully as difficult, how can a democracy mobilize the free minds of its people through voluntary effort to face the problems of a changing world and to give steady support to the hard, costly and unfamiliar policies which our country must be prepared to adopt?

Speaking for the Communist world, Khrushchev has made it clear he believes the United States and the other Western democracies are bound to fail and that the future belongs to communism. Are we ready, through our own endeavors, to disprove this prediction?

The first question calls for a supreme effort of intelligence, imagination and long-range vision on the part of our government officials, of our Congressmen and of the best minds of our nation that Washington can enlist from universities, schools, industry and labor. The second question must be answered in the field of education. Is it possible, by setting the facts and problems of world affairs frankly and objectively before the American public and by encouraging the free play of thought and discussion, to create the intensity of conviction which totalitarian states achieve through the machinery of governmental propaganda?

The Foreign Policy Association is convinced that this na-

tion's skills in education and communications, and the capacities of our voluntary associations, have never been put to the kind of civic test of which they are capable and for which they are ready in mid-20th century. It believes that understanding and even sacrifice can emerge from untrammeled debate among free men. Government can and must give leadership. But in the end, success on the world scene, as well as at home, will depend on the efforts of mind and will of educators, organizations and those responsible for the communication of news.

This is a task for no one group or organization, but for citizens of all parties and all persuasions. The questions raised here about the impact of the six major revolutionary changes of our times on foreign policy are only a sampling of the issues which will face the American people in the decades to come.

In this work of enhancing the opportunities of American leadership in world affairs and through it the survival of the non-Communist world, the FPA sees for itself a limited but crucial task. For free minds to be mobilized, the great issues of our times must be set in clear focus and brought home to a significant number of the American people. The FPA proposes to join forces with organizations, opinion leaders and educators throughout the nation to demonstrate that the grave issues we face can be clarified and the full resources of heart and mind of our citizens engaged in their adjustment.

The well-known radio and TV commentator, Eric Sevareid, well expressed our present danger when he said on September 3, 1958: "In this crisis with China, the people are not even being asked to think, by their leaders or by their press; and if very many people are thinking hard about it, they are not doing so out loud; they remain astonishingly still, as if nothing they could say or do would make any difference." Yet unless American citizens do think about policies abroad, as well as at home, democracy could be jeopardized here without any enemy attack.

Americans often ask themselves: Why it is that, with all our communication facilities—newspapers, radio, TV, movies—we seem unable to convey to other peoples a true image of the great qualities and achievements of the United States? But the most skillful advertising cannot create the product it promotes; the product must already be in existence before it goes into the hands of advertisers. If we are to convey the image of greatness, we must determine to act greatly—not only on occasions of crisis, such as Pearl Harbor or Korea, but day in, day out; not only in Washington, but from Maine to California, from Texas to New York.

No country can survive without leaders; but the measure of a democracy is shown by the qualities of intelligence and concern displayed by every citizen.

It is with renewed hope for the future of democracy that the FPA looks to the next 40 years.

A PLAN OF ACTION

FOREIGN POLICY ASSOCIATION and WORLD AFFAIRS CENTER

The Foreign Policy Association and World Affairs Center have these major objectives: (1) To define and set forth forcefully to the American people the foreign policy issues confronting the United States today; (2) to aid in stimulating more world affairs educational activity by private and public agencies; (3) to provide the needed materials and services for those engaged in world affairs education.

The issuance of *World in Turmoil* as a 40th Anniversary Statement on United States foreign policy is an initial step this year in carrying out these objectives. Using this statement as a base, the Association has developed background materials for American communities, to serve the purposes of group discussion, news media use and organizational promotion on eight "Great Decisions" of United States foreign policy. The bi-monthly *Foreign Policy Bulletin* and the *Headline Series,* issued six times a year, are being used to give a more topical and current focus to these "Great Decisions" and other foreign policy issues confronting the nation. A national educational program on world affairs, however, must include many organizations and many approaches. The FPA and Center are prepared to cooperate, to the limits of their resources, with other groups in forwarding this common purpose.

On November 11th, 1958, a conference on "Requirements For Survival," attended by leaders from major national and local groups takes place at the World Affairs Center. This will be followed by other conferences of citizen leaders by FPA and the Center as part of an effort to stimulate new thinking and action on world affairs. This task is being advanced further by two major public events: a meeting in New York City on January 9, 1959, featuring the chief foreign correspondents for NBC, who will give their views on the eight "Great Decisions" of foreign policy set forth by the Association; a similar public meeting will be held in Philadelphia on January 6th with the chief foreign correspondents of CBS participating.

These two NBC and CBS events and the November 11th conference officially launch a nationwide educational effort being undertaken with other organizations, educational institutions and communication facilities. During February and March of 1959, 75,000 to 100,000 Americans will participate in discussion of the "Great Decisions" and several millions more will hear, view and read about these issues through weekly background programs and articles on radio, television and in the press.

The activities and services of the World Affairs Center are a counterpart to this nationwide community effort. Its Book and Pamphlet Shop, Audio-Visual Department and Information and Reference Section handle thousands of inquiries from individuals and groups on materials, international questions and citizen activities. A Program Department plans convenings of citizen leaders.

The FPA and World Affairs Center firmly believe that only through cooperation in a common effort with other organizations and institutions, can the present challenge to the nation in foreign policy be effectively met. We hope this new program and the issuance of this 40th Anniversary Statement represent a useful contribution to the efforts being made by the many groups concerned with an effective American response to this, the greatest challenge of our times.

November 10, 1958 345 East 46th Street, N.Y. 17, N.Y.